June 3, 2022

Mr. James Sheesley  
Assistant Executive Secretary  
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation  
550 17th Street NW  
Washington, DC 20429

RE: STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES FOR CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT FOR LARGE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS [RIN 3064-ZA32]

Dear Mr. Sheesley:

The Independent Community Bankers of America (“ICBA”)¹ is pleased to provide comments in response to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (“FDIC” or “the agency”) request for information regarding its statement of principles for climate-related financial risk management for large financial institutions (“the FDIC principles”).²

ICBA appreciates the FDIC limiting its proposed climate-related financial risk management framework to financial institutions with more than $100 billion in assets. Nevertheless, ICBA is concerned the FDIC principles, if finalized, will have far-reaching consequences that will negatively impact the small communities serviced by community banks. ICBA is also concerned the FDIC principles will eventually be applied to community banks, forcing an untenable and unnecessary regulatory burden upon the nation’s smallest banks and their customers.³

1 The Independent Community Bankers of America® creates and promotes an environment where community banks flourish. With nearly 50,000 locations nationwide, community banks constitute roughly 99 percent of all banks, employ nearly 700,000 Americans and are the only physical banking presence in one in three U.S. counties. Holding nearly $5.9 trillion in assets, over $4.9 trillion in deposits, and more than $3.5 trillion in loans to consumers, small businesses and the agricultural community, community banks channel local deposits into the Main Streets and neighborhoods they serve, spurring job creation, fostering innovation and fueling their customers’ dreams in communities throughout America.


3 For example, in a statement accompanying the publication of the FDIC principles, Acting Chairman Gruenberg expressly stated, “all financial institutions, regardless of size, complexity, or business model, are subject to climate-related financial risks.” FDIC, Statement by Martin J. Gruenberg, Acting Chairman, FDIC Board of Directors on the Request for Comment on the Statement of Principles for Climate-Related Financial Risk Management for Large Financial Institutions (March 30, 2022) available at: https://www.fdic.gov/news/speeches/2022/spmar3022.html.
Additionally, ICBA is troubled the agency published the FDIC principles without first conducting any independent studies or gathering empirical data from FDIC supervised institutions to examine the extent to which banks may or may not be managing climate related financial risks, and in turn, the degree in which climate risks may, or may not, pose an immediate threat to bank safety and soundness or the stability of the financial system.⁴ The FDIC principles are nearly identical to the OCC’s draft principles for climate-related financial risk management for large banks (“the OCC principles”), which the OCC published only six months ago. Notably, the OCC principles were also published without that agency performing any studies or gathering empirical data to demonstrate climate-risks are a threat to bank safety and soundness.⁵

The absence of empirical data to support the publication of either the FDIC principles or the OCC principles coupled with the FDIC’s repurposing of the OCC principles suggests the true aim of this proposal may be to effectuate “Operation Chokepoint” by choking off legal but climate disfavored businesses and industries from the financial system. Operation Chokepoint was a misguided agency initiative that should never be resurrected, no matter how laudable the end-goal may be.

In light of these concerns, ICBA appreciates this opportunity to reiterate the comments we offered in response to the OCC’s proposed framework, offer our recommendations for how the FDIC principles or future guidance can be improved, and share our reasoning why the FDIC should not apply this proposed climate risk management framework to community banks.

I. The FDIC Has Not Published Empirical Data to Support Its Conclusion that Climate-related Financial Risk Is a Threat to Bank Safety and Soundness.

On May 20, 2021, President Biden signed an Executive Order directing the Secretary of the Treasury, as the Chair of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”), to “engage with FSOC members” to assess climate-related financial risk.⁶ In response to the Executive Order, the FSOC subsequently published a report on climate related financial risks, which directed FSOC members to “address climate-related financial risks consistent with their mandates, focusing on the safety and soundness of regulated institutions.”⁷ Only two months later, on December 16, 2021, the OCC published the OCC principles which set forth the sweeping conclusion that “weaknesses in how banks identify, measure, monitor, and


control the potential physical and transition risks associated with a changing climate could adversely affect a bank’s safety and soundness, as well as the overall financial system.”

While both the President and the FSOC asked the federal financial regulators to explore climate-related financial risks consistent with their mandates, neither concluded climate-related financial risks constitute a safety and soundness risk to individual banks. Yet, the OCC principles and the FDIC principles cite the FSOC Report as the definitive support for the agencies’ conclusions that climate-related financial risks may threaten bank safety and soundness.

The echo chamber between the FSOC, the OCC, and now the FDIC is reverberating. ICBA questions why the FDIC has not offered its own additional, independent, or separate evidentiary, statistical, meteorological, or empirical support for its position, or cited even a single instance of bank failure related to an extreme weather event or due to a bank’s failure to manage climate-related financial risk. Additionally troublesome is that the FDIC has not acknowledged that other federal financial regulators have concluded “the average FEMA disaster is not detrimental to bank stability.”

Without more data to support its conclusions, any final rules or guidance the FDIC issues on climate-related financial risk could be deemed arbitrary and capricious. To mitigate these concerns, we encourage the FDIC to gather empirical data, conduct studies, and coordinate with the members of FSOC, as well as other government stakeholders including the SBA, FEMA, and USDA, prior to engaging in further rulemaking or issuing additional guidance related to climate-related financial risk.

II. The FDIC Should Explain Its Approach to Climate-related Financial Risk Is Not Intended to Facilitate “Operation Chokepoint.”

ICBA is concerned the FDIC principles, however well-intentioned the framework may be, will politicize the agency, jeopardize the independence of the agency, and discourage banks from doing business with legal but climate disfavored industries such as carbon-intensive industries. Because the FDIC principles broadly apply to every facet of risk management, and do not provide guidance to banks or examiners to differentiate material climate-related risk exposures from all conceivable climate-related risk exposures, there is a troubling possibility the FDIC could cite deficiencies in climate-related risk management at every bank in every examination. As such, ICBA is concerned the FDIC could use the FDIC principles to implement “Operation Chokepoint” and pressure banks to terminate business relationships with clients engaged in lawful activity by “de-risking” their portfolios and declining basic banking services, such as deposit accounts and loans, to entire categories of industries the FDIC believes may present climate-related financial risk.

The FDIC broadly defines “transition risks” as “stresses to certain banks or sectors arising from the shifts in policy, consumer and business sentiment, or technologies associated with the changes necessary to

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9 Staff Reports, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, How Bad are Weather Disasters for Banks?, No. 990 (Nov. 2021) at page 9 (emphasis added) available at: https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr990.
limit climate change.” Although the FDIC does not further define transition risks, provide examples of transition risks, or specify which industries or occurrences might pose the most material transition risks, the FDIC principles require large financial institutions to analyze transition risk considerations within every aspect of risk management, including governance, policies, procedures and limits, strategic planning, risk management, data risk measurement and reporting, and scenario analysis. The FDIC principles also require large financial institutions to analyze transition risks within every facet of risk assessments including credit risk, liquidity risk, other financial risk, operational risk, legal and compliance risk, and other nonfinancial risk.

Both the breadth and lack of specificity in this proposal leave open the possibility that any number of lawful industries could be choked off from the financial system for posing climate risk, including industries that are carbon-intensive, or consume large amounts of water, energy and other natural resources, or produce, supply, or consume fertilizer and chemicals, or generate waste, and the list goes on.

It is plausible an examiner could broadly interpret the FDIC principles in such a way that any banking activity that poses a physical or transition climate risk must be eliminated entirely. Banks should not be forced by their regulator to de-risk entire categories of business customers based on speculation that transition risks, no matter how remote, could negatively impact the customer. Further, while community banks typically are not the primary source of financing for large energy producing companies, they do provide the majority of small business credit in those communities where energy production, refinement, transportation and other ancillary businesses exist. Policies that would reduce access to credit to those businesses because they are connected to the fossil fuel industry would have devastating impacts on the local economies served by community banks.

The Department of Justice has concluded that Operation Chokepoint was a “misguided initiative” and that “law abiding businesses should not be targeted simply for operating in an industry that a particular administration might disfavor.” If the FDIC has no intention of forcing banks to de-risk their portfolios or choke off lawful but climate disfavored industries from the financial system, the agency should make this abundantly clear in any finalized guidance and/or rules and state there will not be a supervisory expectation that banks de-risk entire geographies or industries from their lending portfolios.


As stewards of their local communities, community bankers have every incentive to ensure their lending practices support the long-term prosperity of their local economies. A community bank cannot flourish without the success of the local community because its customers and loan portfolios are geographically concentrated within the local markets the community bank serves. The risks of economic shocks,


customer displacement and damaged collateral (risks the FDIC characterizes in the context of climate change as “transition risks” and “physical risks”) are not novel risks for community banks to manage, and each of these risks, if not properly managed, undoubtedly has the potential to impact a community bank. But history has shown that because community banks are experts in managing their risk, community banks do not fail simply because climate-related financial risks exist. This fact is evidenced by the FDIC’s failure to publish any empirical data to explain the Acting Chairman’s conclusion that “climate-related financial risks pose a clear and significant risk to the U.S. financial system, and if improperly assessed and managed, may pose a threat to safe and sound banking and financial stability.”

Importantly, although FDIC data shows 4,104 U.S. banks have failed since 1934, the FDIC principles do not describe a single instance of bank failure due to a bank’s improper management of “physical risks” and “transition risks” related to climate change.

While the FDIC believes “financial institutions are likely to be affected by both the physical risks and transition risks associated with climate change,” these “affects” are not necessarily negative, and do not ipso facto constitute threats to bank safety and soundness. In fact, in a recent New York Federal Reserve staff report titled, “How Bad are Weather Disasters for Banks?” (“the Staff Report”), the financial regulator evaluated all FEMA disasters and found “generally insignificant or small effects on bank performance and stability. In particular, loan losses and default risk at local banks [did] not increase significantly . . . [m]oreover, not all effects are bad; income of multi-county banks increase significantly with disaster exposure.” According to the Staff Report, “local banks” (i.e. community banks) have “superior geographic knowledge” that “helps them avoid areas where disaster risks are more frequent than expected based on common knowledge.” Community banks have superior geographic knowledge as compared to their large-bank counterparts because “banks located closer to their borrowers have been found to harbor knowledge of both borrowers and local risk that more distant lenders may lack.” For example, “local banks reallocated mortgage lending from census tracts where flood risks seem understated relative to the FEMA maps (given recent flooding experience).” By contrast, the Staff Report’s authors did not observe similar behavior at multi-county banks.

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14 Staff Reports, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, How Bad are Weather Disasters for Banks?, No. 990 (Nov. 2021) at page 9 (emphasis added) available at: https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr990.

15 Id.

16 Id.

17 Id.
The detailed findings from the New York Federal Reserve are strong evidence community banks do not need additional regulation to manage climate-related financial risks. Since the late 19th century, community banks have successfully implemented risk management practices, and in so doing, have weathered and survived every type of natural disaster, including catastrophic hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes, wind events, droughts, freezes, snowstorms, wildfires, landslides, volcanoes, and flooding. As detailed below, community banks’ current, validated, and long-standing risk management practices are not only adequate for community banks to evaluate climate-related financial risks, but they are also effective in ensuring community banks are operationally resilient and protected from failure in the aftermath of economic shocks and natural disasters.

a. *Disaster Preparedness and Response*

Community banks are well-equipped to prepare for and respond to natural disasters and property losses. Community banks maintain detailed business continuity plans which outline the processes the bank will follow before, during, and after a natural disaster to safeguard employees, customers, products and services, and remain operational with limited business disruption. These disaster plans are not obscure documents buried in dusty file drawers but are instead meticulously prepared, diligently tested, and carefully guarded reference guides that bank employees are ready to follow at any moment’s notice. Business continuity plans not only contemplate the physical destruction of bank collateral, including the bank headquarters, ATMS, and branches, but also detail how the bank will respond to the needs of its customers and the community-at-large, and, in particular cash needs, in the aftermath of a disaster’s destruction. As part of these plans, community banks proactively ensure they have enough cash on hand to meet customer needs and that redundant systems are in place so customers can continue to use debit cards and banks can readily access digitally stored bank records. Community banks also contemplate how bank employees can continue to utilize operationally critical systems and communicate with bank personnel, emergency responders, regulators, customers, and vendors in the event there is a loss of power, loss of physical bank records, inaccessible roadways, and displaced bank employees and customers.

b. *Concentration Risk Management*

Community banks are also adept in managing other types of risks, such as concentration risk, under the FDIC’s existing risk management framework. Every community bank portfolio is concentrated geographically, thus all community banks are exposed to some degree of credit concentration risk. Yet, exposure to concentration risk, even significant concentration risk, is not indicative that a bank will fail or that the bank should be subject to heightened supervisory scrutiny. Instead, the relevant inquiry is whether the concentration risk is material and whether the bank has properly managed its risk exposures. To measure the materiality of concentration risk, community banks and their regulators evaluate the quantity of risk exposures, the quality of a bank’s risk management framework, the strength of bank governance, the adequacy of internal controls, and perform stress tests. As demonstrated during thousands of examinations, community banks are adept in mitigating risk due to seasonal weather changes and natural disasters, and credit concentration and should not be subject to additional burdensome, costly, duplicative, and unnecessary climate-related risk management practices.

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c. Underwriting Practices and Estimating Allowance for Loan and Lease Losses ("ALLL")

Existing due diligence and underwriting practices enable community bankers to carefully assess the level of risk posed by every customer relationship and ensure effective controls are in place to monitor these relationships on an ongoing basis. If necessary, community banks will shorten the maturity of their loans to protect the bank not only from interest rate risk but also from many different types of underwriting risks including climate risks.

Additionally, under the current supervisory framework for estimating credit losses, banks are expressly required to consider “qualitative or environmental factors that are likely to cause estimated credit losses associated with the institution’s existing portfolio to differ from historical loss experience.”19 The FDIC and other prudential regulators expect allowance estimates for ALLL to be “based on a comprehensive, well-documented, and consistently applied analysis of the loan portfolio, and should take into consideration all available information existing as of the financial statement date, including environmental factors such as industry, geographical, economic, and political factors.”20

Plainly stated, the qualitative and environmental factors community banks currently use to analyze the adequacy of ALLL already estimate and quantify climate-related financial risk. For example, if a bank is located in a market that is in severe drought, the bank will increase qualitative and environmental factors to account for this increased risk to the loan portfolio, which in turn results in an increase in the bank’s allowance estimate. Since community banks already consider qualitative and environmental factors as part of their “comprehensive, well-documented, and consistently applied ALLL analysis,” and since most community banks will be subject to CECL by 2023 and be required to be forward looking with their estimates of loan losses, a separate risk management framework for climate risk is unnecessary.

d. Securing Insurance Policies to Offset Risk

With respect to their lending and investment activities, community banks are keenly aware of the importance of risk mitigation particularly during times of economic stress or extreme weather events. To mitigate climate, disaster, and concentration risks, community banks ensure their property loans have adequate flood insurance and their agricultural loans have adequate crop insurance. Crop insurance allows agricultural producers to recover from severe weather disasters and repay their farm loans.

Additionally, community banks diversify their agricultural loan portfolios by utilizing the safety nets, insurance, and market protections for farmers and agricultural lenders authorized by the farm bill, including the Farm Service Agency’s Guaranteed Farm Loan Programs. The farm bill, adopted by Congress approximately every five years, provides an income safety net for commodity prices to bolster income for farmers and ranchers. The farm bill also offers farmers and ranchers several guaranteed farm loan programs. The guaranteed farm loan programs protect up to 90 – 95 percent of the loan principal,


20 Id.
thus ensuring the repayment of most of the loan principal should farmers and ranchers become unable to repay their loans. These programs also help protect community banks against loan losses by providing tools to manage their concentration risks, which is particularly important to banks that specialize in agricultural lending.

IV. Mandatory Scenario Analysis Is Not Appropriate for Community Banks.

Scenario analysis is a complex, data-driven modeling exercise that should not be mandatory for community banks. To perform mandatory scenario analysis, community banks would likely need to hire specialized third-party consultants and experts to perform the work. Our members report that even conservative estimates for an independent audit can exceed $100,000. Because there are few individuals and firms qualified to perform climate change scenario analysis, the demand for this service, if mandatory for community banks, would only push the costs of these audits and exercises even higher. Community banks cannot afford to pay hundreds of thousands of dollars to third parties to perform climate change scenario analyses, particularly if these analyses are evaluating immaterial or remote climate-related financial risks or are unlikely to result in any measurable changes to business operations.

Since most community banks will be subject to CECL beginning in 2023, many of them will find it necessary to stress test their loan portfolios to make accurate estimates of future losses under the new accounting standard. Further, community banks can test and validate their business continuity plans by participating in FEMA’s National Exercise Program and the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program. Given that community bank portfolios are generally not as complex as large bank portfolios, and because community banks already perform numerous stress testing exercises, community banks simply do not need to perform yet another duplicative scenario analysis.

ICBA is also concerned mandatory scenario analysis could force community banks to engage in an impossibly difficult exercise of forecasting for remote risks that may occur decades in the future, or which may never transpire. The longer the timeframes that are selected in scenario analysis for default and loss projections, the more speculative and expensive the analysis becomes, while the utility of the exercise, and the likelihood of any measurable changes to the business, are greatly reduced.

V. Any Approach to Climate-related Financial Risk Management Must be Guided by Materiality

One of the biggest challenges community banks would face in incorporating the FDIC principles into their risk management systems is anticipating, measuring, forecasting, and analyzing unknown and unquantifiable risks. As proposed, the FDIC principles are incredibly broad and lack specificity to help banks and examiners identify material climate-related financial risks that could warrant heightened scrutiny. The FDIC principles do not contain any guardrails to ensure examiners cannot get carried away in criticizing financially healthy banks on the basis of remote, or highly speculative, or immaterial climate-related risks.

The FDIC principles also do not contain defining terms, detailed hypothetical or explanatory examples, time periods for forecasting, or even specify a common data set banks should use to analyze climate related financial risks. ICBA is concerned that without any of these limits, the FDIC principles can broadly apply to every type of physical risk or transition risk imaginable, no matter how immaterial or remote, and banks could therefore be subject to undue regulatory scrutiny for minor deficiencies in
their risk management programs that are only tenuously related to climate-risk. The resources and costs that would be necessary to comply with the FDIC principles could quickly overwhelm a community bank’s limited staff or force a community bank to de-risk entire industries or loan portfolios even if the bank had no other safety and soundness weaknesses.

VI. ICBA Recommendations

➢ To the greatest extent possible, the FDIC should coordinate with other agencies and develop a harmonized approach to climate change with the members of the FSOC, as well as the SBA, FEMA, and USDA. These agencies should adopt a flexible approach that acknowledges evolving bank and supervisory practices as well as varying degrees of material climate-related financial risks.

➢ The FDIC should conduct outreach meetings with community banks to better understand why climate risk principles that may be appropriate for large institutions are not appropriate for community banks.

➢ The FDIC should not apply the FDIC principles or any climate-related financial risk framework to community banks with fewer than $100 billion in assets.

➢ Before finalizing the FDIC principles or any additional guidance, the FDIC should conduct studies jointly with the members of FSOC, as well as the SBA, FEMA, and USDA to understand whether empirical data supports the conclusion that climate risks are a significant threat to the safety and soundness of the financial system, and to determine whether a separate climate-related financial risk management framework is necessary.

➢ The FDIC should host voluntary climate risk exercises, similar to tech sprints, to facilitate an open dialogue among government stakeholders, banks, insurers, vendors, and other third parties and to identify whether a separate climate-related financial risk management framework is necessary.

➢ If the FDIC’s climate-related financial risk management framework is not intended to “choke-off” specific industries from the financial system, any future guidance should expressly inform examiners there is no supervisory expectation that banks de-risk legal but climate disfavored industries.

➢ ICBA is supportive of some incentive-based solutions to address climate change. For example, the New York Department of Financial Services (“NYDFS”) recently issued an industry letter which describes the circumstances in which banking institutions subject to the New York Community Reinvestment Act (“NY CRA”) may receive credit in connection with financing projects addressing climate change, including credit for financing activities that reduce or prevent the emission of greenhouse gases that cause climate change, and adapt to life in a changing climate. The NYDFS has stated banks may qualify for credit under the NY CRA for community development lending or qualified investments that stabilize community development such as investments in renewable energy and water conservation equipment to reduce utility payments for low to moderate income (“LMI”) tenants, community solar projects, microgrid or battery storage projects in LMI areas with high flood and/or wind risk, projects
addressing flooding or sewer issues or reducing storm runoffs, flood resilience activities for multifamily buildings offering affordable housing, and installation of air conditioning in multifamily buildings offering affordable housing.\textsuperscript{21}

Once again, ICBA appreciates this opportunity to share our views on the FDIC principles. Please feel free to contact Jenna Burke at jenna.burke@icba.org should you wish to discuss our comments in further detail.

Sincerely,

/s/ Jenna Burke

Jenna Burke
Senior Vice President, Senior Regulatory Counsel
Independent Community Bankers of America